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Abstract 
The study is aimed to detecting earning management from companies listing in Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange (HOSE) during the period from 2013 – 2015 by using 2 models, Jones (1991) and 
Modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995). Moreover, we also tested the 
effectiveness of Jones (1991) for detecting firms’ earning management since prior researches 
showed that Jones (1991) has lower standard error in detecting accruals based earning 
management compared with other models as suggested by DeAngelo et al. (1994). Hence we 
proposed that Jones (1991) provides a more significant outcome for estimating the 
nondiscretionary component of accruals and thus less exposed to misspecifications error from 
absent variables. We found that Jones (1991) illustrates a better explainable ability even though 
the adjusted R-square of the models is closely similar with each other. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has been gaining a lot of attention recently. Earnings management is characterized as 
the adjustment of firms’ financial statements and actual economic performance by insiders or administrators to 
either ―deceive some stakeholders‖ or to ―control contractual outcomes‖ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Many studies 
about earning management proposed that managers process manipulation to their reported earnings to match their 
motives by adapting certain company’s accounting procedure, altering accounting estimation, and/or managing 
accruals. Earnings management is able to create unfavorable consequences for the value of the companies in the 
long term. Previous studies found that firms involving in earnings management to meet and/or overcoming 
analyst predictions have benefited from a rising stock price, but this advantage appears only for a short term. For 
the long term, the performance and share price of those companies involved in managing earnings are less 
sustainable than enterprises that did not employ earning management technique (Bhojraj et al., 2009). Earnings 
management also creates an apparent disadvantage for financial information users like external stakeholders who 
faced an asymmetric information problem and count on the financial report to come up with final decisions in order 
to make important investment (Burns and Merchant, 1990). The act of manipulating earnings also contravenes the 
accounting’s practical code of professional. Managing earning can violate the relevant rules of accounting. For 
example, the act of successful manipulation to cover earning adjustments, disguising a failure to meet or exceed 
forecasted profit by financial analyst, changing a loss into profit or vice versa (Grant et al., 2000). Earning 
management has been gaining more attention since the fraudulent scandal of Enron and WorldCom were exposed 
and judged as an unethical action of manipulating earning management. 
There are many popular and well known models developed by Healy (1985); DeAngelo (1986); Jones (1991); 
Patricia et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) used to identify and investigate the actions of manipulating earnings 
management of firm managers, but  in Vietnam lacks of such studies, even though the difference between pre- and 
post-audit earnings of Vietnamese firms listing in Vietnamese stock markets is announced rather regularly, so that 
we suspect the existence of manipulating earnings management among these firms. Therefore, this study was 
carried out for identifying the action on earnings management from the listed companies on HOSE, and 
investigating the effectiveness of Jones (1991). 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Earning Management Definition  
Earnings management happens when firm managers makes adjustment in reporting financial statement deceive 
shareholders, investors, creditor and readers of financial report about the actual operating performance of the 
company or to create an impact on profitable outcomes which rely on reported numbers on financial statement 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999).   
 
2.2. Models for Detecting Accrual Based Earning Management  
2.2.1. Healy (1985) 
Healy (1985) studied relationship between earning management and executive compensation, and developed 
the model to evaluate nondiscretionary as in below equation: 
NDAt+1 = (1/n)Ʃ (TAi,t /A t-1) 
Where:         
NDAt+1 = nondiscretionary accruals for period t+1 
TA i,t = total accruals in year t for firm i 
At-1 = total assets in year t-1 for the firm i 
n = number of years   
Healy model estimates non-discretionary accruals. The discretionary accrual is calculated by subtracting the 
nondiscretionary accruals from the total accruals from the estimated period. 
 
2.2.2. Jones (1991) 
Jones (1991) developed the model to detect the accrual based earning management, and become the most 
widely used model for estimation of earnings management. The model is expressed as below: 
TAi,t  = Q0(1/Ai,t–1) + Q1ΔREVi,t + Q2PPEi,t + si,t 
Where: 
TAi,t  = total accruals in year t for firm i   
ΔREVi,t = revenues in year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm i scaled by Ai,t-1 
PPEi,t = gross property, plant and equipment in the year t for the firm i scaled by Ai,t-1  
Ai,t-1 = total assets in year t-1 for the firm i 
εi,t  = error term in the year t for firm i 
Jones (1991) is a linearly related regression approach with the explanatory variables as changes in revenue, and 
the gross property, plant and equipment, which represent the control for non-discretionary accruals, and regress 
total accruals. This model was developed with an assumption that all revenues are nondiscretionary and the 
changes in revenue as a nondiscretionary accrual. Thus, if managers use technique of manipulating revenue, Jones 
(1991) cannot identify or may underestimate discretionary accruals, according to Ronen and Yaari (2008). 
Moreover, heteroskedasticity in the model as a big problem; to control the heteroskedasticity, all the variables 
included, dependent and independent variables, are divided by lagged assets, however, White (1980) stated that 
heteroskedasticity is reduced by deflation of a variable, but not to be eliminated.  
 
2.2.3. Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. (1995) 
The model of Jones (1991) was adjusted by Dechow et al. (1995) for addressing the problems above. The model 
is specified as below: 
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TAi,t =  Q0(1/Ai,t–1) + Q1(ΔREVi,t — ΔRECi,t) + Q2PPEi,t  + εi,t 
Where: 
TAi,t   =  total  accruals  in  year  t  for  firm  i scaled by Ai,t-1 
ΔREVi,t = revenues in the year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm i scaled by Ai,t-1 
ΔRECi,t = receivables in the year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i scaled by Ai,t-1  
PPEi,t = gross property, plant and equipment in the year t for the firm i scaled by Ai,t-1  
Ai,t-1 = total assets in year t-1 for the firm i 
εi,t  = error term in the year t for firm i 
Change in accounts receivable is accounted for by the changes in revenue because manipulation is the first 
modification of Dechow et al. (1995). Another effect that the modification caused is cash sales is now adopted in the 
model because of containing changes in accounts receivable, and this addresses the problems  in the Jones (1991).  
 
2.2.4. Modified Jones Model by Kothari et al. (2005) 
Performance matching model developed by Kothari et al. (2005) improved on the Jones (1991) and the Modified 
Jones Model by Patricia et al. (1995). The two most well-known models for detect earnings management above are 
not able to present the correlation between accruals and firm performance because of misspecification in cases of 
firms that had intense performance (Patricia et al., 1995); (Kothari et al., 2005) debated that operating performance 
must appear in the equation of discretionary, and thus their model can be used for investigating relation between 
discretionary accruals and the performance of firms. 
TAi,t  =  Q0 + Q1 (1/Ai,t–1)+  Q2ΔREVi,t +  Q3PPEi,t +  Q4ROAi,t + si,t 
Where: 
TAi,t = total accruals in year t for firm i   
ΔREVi,t = revenues in the year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm i scaled byAi,t-1 
PPEi,t = in the year t for the firm i scaled by Ai,t-1  
ROAi,t = return on assets in the year t for firm i scaled by Ai,t-1 
Ai,t-1 = total assets in year t-1 for the firm i 
εi,t  = error term in the year t for firm 
This study used three popular models that is the Jones (1991) the Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. (1995) 
and Modified Jones Model by Kothari et al. (2005) to detect earnings management in listed firms on HOSE. 
 
2.2.5. Data Collection 
Data is collected from the annual financial reports between 2013-2015 from 300 nonfinancial companies listed 
on HOSE from the website cophieu68.vn.   
 
2.2.6. Models Standardized for Controlling Heteroskedasticity  
To reduce the heteroskedasticity, three models are standardized by dividing all their components by total asset 
(Ai,t-1). The standardized models expressed as below: 
 Jones (1991): 
TAi,t/ Ai,t–1 = β0(1/Ai,t–1) +  β1ΔREVi,t/Ai,t–1 +  β2 PPEi,t/Ai,t–1 + si,t 
 Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. (1995): 
TAi,t/ Ai,t–1  =  β0 (1/Ai,t–1) + β1 (ΔREVi,t — ΔRECi,t) + β2 PPEi,t  + εi,t 
 Modified Jones Model by Kothari et al. (2005) 
TAi,t/ Ai,t–1  =  β0 (1/Ai,t–1)+  β1 ΔREVi,t +  β2 PPEi,t +  β3 ROAi,t + si,t 
 
2.2.7. Measuring Earnings Management 
Earnings management is assumed to be the act of manipulating accruals. Accruals could be either an 
impression of earnings manipulation or just usual accounting measures based on the expectations of business in the 
future. It is not easy to identify which one would affect accruals. However, it was proven that the size of accruals 
could be employed as a harsh measurement for manipulating earnings, especially companies with high-accrual. 
To determine the total net accruals estimated in a specific period of time, we must subtract the cash earnings 
from the accruals earning for the period. There are two approaches using: the balance sheet or the cash-flow 
statement in order to calculate the total net accruals hidden in the reported earnings. In this study the balance 
sheet method was used to process the measurement of total accrual, and the total net accruals can be estimated as 
below: 
Total accruals = Accrual Earnings + Cash Earnings (1) 
Apparently, accrual earnings and cash earnings are not presented in the balance sheet, to retrieve this 
information, further calculation must be performed. 
Step 1: Estimating Accrual Earnings 
Net income appears in the balance sheet as retained earnings, which serves as a part of owners' equity. Moreover, 
the net distribution to equity holder is demonstrated by owners’ equity, thus this item should be modified. 
Therefore, the owners’ equity will be estimated as the equation below: 
Ending equity = Beginning equity – cash dividends – stock repurchases + equity issuance 
To estimate accrual earnings, the above formula can be rearranged to identify the difference between ending 
owners' equity and beginning owners' equity, and then adjusting it with stock repurchases, dividends, and stock 
issuances. This adjustment represents the net cash distributions to equity. 
Accrual Earnings (AE) =? Owner Equity + Cash Dividend + Stock Repurchases – Equity Issuance 
AE = ? Owner Equity + Net Cash Distribution to Equity 
Now, assuming that Assets - Liabilities = Owners' Equity, we can substitute in to get the following equation for 
accrual earnings: 
Accrual Earnings =? Assets - ? Liabilities + Net Cash Distribution to Equity (2) 
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Step 2: Estimating Cash Earnings 
To start, cash earning have a relation with cash account and can be determined by looking at the changes. 
Moreover, net cash distributions to equity holders also have influence on cash account, and these items need to be 
adjusted. Therefore, at the end of the period, cash earnings will be: 
Cash Earnings =? Cash + Cash Dividend + Stock Repurchase – Equity Issuance =? Cash + Net Distribution to 
Equity (3) 
Step 3:  Estimating Total Net Accruals 
From (1), (2), (3) we have: 
Total Net Accruals = Accrual Earnings – Cash Earning 
= (? Assets - ? Liabilities – Net Cash Distribution to Equity) – (? Cash + Net Cash Distribution to Equity) 
The net cash distributions to equity eliminate each other out, and the equation reduces to: 
Total Net Accruals =? Assets - ? Liabilities - ? Cash 
 
3. Results   
3.1. Ordinary Least Square Regression 
 
Table-1. OLS regression results 
Jones (1991) Coefficients p-value 
1/Ai,t-1 .720 0.000 
ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 -.261 0.000 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 -.124 0.012 
Patricia et al. (1995) Coefficients p-value 
1/Ai,t-1 788 0.000 
ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t) /Ai,t-1 .055 0.170 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 -.317 0.000 
Kothari et al. (2005) Coefficients p-value 
1/Ai,t-1 .717 0.000 
ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 -.269 0.000 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 -.151 0.010 
ROAi,t /Ai,t-1 .850 0.396 
                                            Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8  
 
The results shows that two variables (ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 and PPEi,t /Ai,t-1), significantly, explains the variance 
of total net accruals of the 3 models (see Table 1). Adjusted R-square of all three models is rather higher (Table 2) 
hence, all three models can be applied to detect earnings management of firms. 
 
Table-2. Adjusted R-Square of 3 models 
Model Adjusted R2 p-value 
Jones (1991) 0.618 .000 
Patricia et al. (1995)  0.582 .000 
Kothari et al. (2005) 0.617 .000 
                                                 Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8 
 
3.2. Multicollinearity Test  
If ―multicollinearity‖ appeared, in which two certain independent variables themselves create a linear relation 
with each other, then the results generated by regressions will be biased. Therefore we tested for multicollinearity 
and the test results presented in Table 3. 
 
Table-3. Detecting multicollinearity 
Jones (1991) Variance Inflation Factor(VIF) 
1/Ai,t-1 1.218 
ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 1.726 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 1.866 
Patricia et al. (1995) VIF 
1/Ai,t-1 1.100 
ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t)/Ai,t-1 1.123 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 1.184 
Kothari et al. (2005) VIF 
1/Ai,t-1 1.228 
ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 1.785 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 2.642 
ROAi,t /Ai,t-1 2.144 
                          Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8 
 
The variance inflation factors (VIF) of all predictors in the three models are lower than 10, therefore we 
conclude that there are no the existence of multicollinearity in all three models.  
 
3.3. Autocorrelation Test 
To detect the existence of autocorrelation in the model Durbin-Watson test was used and the test’s results 
shown in Table 4. 
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Table-4. Durbin-Watson test result 
Models Durbin-Watson test 
Jones (1991) 1.841 
Patricia et al. (1995) 1.839 
Kothari et al. (2005) 1.838 
                                                                     Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8 
 
In Durbin-Watson test, there are 2 critical values, an upper critical value (dU) and a lower critical value (dL). 
There is also an intermediate region where we can neither reject nor accept H0. 
 
 
 
Table-5. Durbin Watson critical values 
Models Lower critical value (dL) Test statistic Upper critical value (dU) 
Jones (1991)  1.79051   1.841 1.83088 
Patricia et al. (1995) 1.79051   1.839 1.83088 
Kothari et al. (2005) 1.78371   1.838 1.83773 
Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8 
 
Table-6. Durbin Watson critical values 
Models dU Test statistic 4 - dU 
Jones (1991) 1.83088 1.841 2.16912 
Patricia et al. (1995) 1.83088 1.839 2.16912 
Kothari et al. (2005) 1.83773 1.838 2.16227 
                                     Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8 
 
The test statistics of all three models are greater than upper critical values (dU) and smaller than 4 –dU. So we 
do not reject the null hypothesis that there is no evidence of autocorrelation in models. 
 
3.4. White Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 
Table-7. White test results 
 
 
 
 
White test resulted in the rejection of null hypothesis, implying the presence of heteroskedasticity in the models. 
 
3.5. Treatment for Heteroskedasticity 
 
Table-8. Treatment results 
Jones (1991) Coefficients p-value 
1/Ai,t-1 -4966.937 0.0098 
ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 .058324 0.0000 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 .019393 0.0865 
Patricia et al. (1995) Coefficients p-value 
1/Ai,t-1  -3754.492 0.0508 
ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t) /Ai,t-1 1.71E-05 0.5922 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 -.317 0.1127 
Kothari et al. (2005) Coefficients p-value 
1/Ai,t-1 -4756.989 0.0118 
ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1 .055435 0.0000 
PPEi,t /Ai,t-1 .014489 0.2711 
ROAi,t /Ai,t-1 46734.9 0.0000 
                                             Source: Calculated by authors from Eview 8 
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Through the tests of heteroskedasticity, we can see that Jones (1991) and Modified Jones model by Kothari et 
al. (2005) have better performance than the Modified Jones Model by Patricia et al. (1995). 
 
4. Discussion  
The three models have closely the same the adjusted R2. However, Jones (1991) and Modified Jones by Kothari 
et al. (2005) outperform the Modified Jones model by Patricia et al. (1995). Firm manager makes the decision to 
manage not only sale revenues but also costs and expenses in the financial reporting. For that reasons, if we do not 
include costs and expenses, it might not fully represent the characteristics of current accrual. The poor explanatory 
power of model may be resulted from not including expenses. Due of this reason, we might recognize that the 
relationship between total accruals and current accruals is imbalanced because the models cannot present a suitable 
and applicable explanation for the relationship. In short, managers are able to select between account receivable 
and account payable to manage earnings. 
Using PPE as a proxy for noncurrent accruals is relatively appropriate, but PPE may not be effective enough 
to represent the real characteristics of noncurrent accruals. The component that should have been acknowledged is 
intangible assets because General Accepted Accounting Principle rules stated that intangible asset investments be 
recorded as expenses in the period they have occurred (International Accounting Standards Boards, 2010). For that 
reason, the model must include additional proxy to represent the intangible assets. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study provided the understanding on how firms manipulate actual earning revealing earning management 
in Vietnamese firms. The study also analyzed the effectiveness of the three most well-known models, and to 
examine how fit of those models in the context of Vietnam. The research’s result demonstrated that Jones Model is 
shown as better measurement in case of effectiveness and explanatory power of selected proxies to detect the act of 
manipulating earning. 
However, the outcome would be more accurate if the intangible asset variable was added to develop a new 
model. Identifying the act of earning management is useful for not only investors but also financial analysts to have 
a deep understanding about the characteristics of emerging stock market like Vietnam market, thus there will be 
more accurate and efficient in making investment decisions. In turn, the operating performance of companies may 
be dramatically improved. 
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